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Abstract 
The international financial system had been experiencing challenges for almost a year before 
the crisis truly manifested in Denmark during the Summer of 2008 with the sudden demise 
of Roskilde Bank, Denmark’s eighth largest bank. As more Danish banks became distressed 
in the fall of 2008 after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the government determined that it 
was necessary to intervene in the banking sector through actions such as taking over and 
winding up distressed banks, giving guarantees to back up the sector, and providing capital 
injections and liquidity support. This paper focuses on the two different types of guarantee 
schemes which were both implemented at the outset of the Global Financial Crisis by the 
Danish government in the fall of 2008 and in early 2009. The main difference between the 
two guarantee schemes was their breadth. While the original guarantee scheme (known in 
Denmark as the “General State Guarantee”) was a blanket guarantee—covering deposits in 
essentially all Danish banks and all unsecured debt regardless of maturity, complexity, or 
any other terms or conditions of the instrument—the new guarantee scheme (known in 
Denmark as the “Individual State Guarantee”) required applications by individual credit 
institutions and covered specific debt issuances. Both programs were heavily utilized. Under 
the General State Guarantee, almost all of the Danish banking industry in terms of market 
share was covered, with only 14 small banks out of almost 140 opting not to be covered. 
Similarly, by the time the issuance window of the Individual State Guarantee initially expired 
in December of 2010, it had guaranteed debt issuances of about 50 institutions that totaled 
approximately DKK 194 billion (approximately €26 billion).  
Keywords: Denmark, Danish, General State Guarantee, Individual State Guarantee, 
Transition Scheme, Credit Scheme, Credit Guarantee Scheme
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee 
programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 








At a Glance  
The Global Financial Crisis hit Denmark 
during the Summer of 2008 with the 
sudden demise of Roskilde Bank, 
Denmark’s eighth largest bank. As more 
Danish banks became distressed after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Danish 
government determined that it was 
necessary to intervene in the banking 
sector. This paper focuses on the two 
different types of guarantee schemes 
implemented by the Danish government in 
the fall of 2008 and in early 2009. While the 
original guarantee scheme (known as the 
“General State Guarantee”) was a blanket 
guarantee—covering essentially all Danish 
banks and all unsecured debt regardless of 
maturity, complexity, or any other terms or 
conditions of the instrument—the new 
guarantee (known as the “Individual State 
Guarantee”) required applications by 
individual credit institutions. Both 
programs were heavily utilized. Under the 
General Guarantee, almost all of the Danish 
banking industry in terms of market share 
was covered, with only 14 small banks out 
of almost 140 opting not to be covered. 
Similarly, by the time the issuance window 
of the Individual Guarantee initially 
expired in December 2010, it had 
guaranteed debt issuances of about 50 
institutions that totaled approximately 
DKK 194 billion (approximately €26 
billion).  
Summary Evaluation 
While it can be difficult to isolate the 
overall effect of any specific policy 
measure used as part of broader response 
to the Great Financial Crisis, both 
guarantee schemes are regarded by the 
Danish government as having helped 
Denmark’s financial sector recover.  
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: Both guarantees were implemented to 
revive interbank lending and meet banks’ liquidity 
needs.  
Announcement Date Oct. 10, 2008 (General); 
Feb. 2, 2009 (Individual) 
Operational Date Oct. 11, 2008 (General); 
Feb. 4, 2009 (Individual) 




June 2009 (Individual)  
Issuance Window 
Expiration Date 
Sep. 30, 2010 (General); 
Initially Dec. 31, 2010, 
later extended to Dec. 31, 
2013 (Individual) 
Program Size Estimated losses at time of 
introduction between DKK 
10-35 billion (€1.34-4.69 
billion) (General); 
Estimated guaranteed debt 
up to DKK 600 billion in 
debt (Individual) 
Usage Total amount of 
guaranteed debt by over 
133 banks is not readily 
available (General); 
DKK 194 billion in 
guaranteed debt by over 
50 institutions (Individual) 
Outcomes DKK 22.5 billion total cost 
for winding up banks and 
paying on defaults, and 
DKK 2.5 billion total in 
profit from fees (General);  
DKK 194 billion in 
guaranteed debt by about 
50 institutions (Individual) 
Notable Features Industry group extensively 
involved in design/funding 
of the General Guarantee 
Denmark Guarantee Scheme 
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$621.0 billion in total assets in 2007 




Size of banking 
system as a 
percentage of GDP 
 
194.1% in 2007 




Size of banking 




Data not available for given year 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database 
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88% of total banking assets in 2007 
89% of total banking assets in 2008 
 




in banking system 
18% of total banking assets in 2008 
18% of total banking assets in 2008 
 




ownership of banking 
system 
 
1% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
 
Source: Call et al. “Bank Ownership – Trends 
and Implications” 
 
Existence of deposit 
insurance 
Data not available for the time frame in 
Denmark 
 
Source: World Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset, 
OECD 
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The international financial system had been experiencing challenges for almost a year before 
the crisis truly manifested in Denmark during the Summer of 2008 with the sudden demise 
of Roskilde Bank—Denmark’s eighth largest bank with a balance sheet of almost DKK 43 
billion (€5.8 billion)3 and approximately 105,000 customers. Roskilde’s collapse was 
symptomatic of a more systemic weakness in Denmark’s banking sector, namely an 
increased dependence on short-term market financing that had reshaped the industry in 
recent years. This weakness was challenged in the fall of 2008 when foreign credit 
institutions and money market funds started to doubt the health and creditworthiness of 
Danish financial institutions. In the wake of Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy in September 
2008, Danish financial institutions were even more severely cut off from access to liquidity 
on account of the international crisis of confidence between financial institutions. 
As more Danish banks became distressed in the fall of 2008, the government determined 
that it was necessary to intervene in the banking sector through actions such as taking over 
and winding up distressed banks, giving guarantees to the sector, and providing capital 
injections and liquidity support. Throughout the financial crisis and its aftermath, Danish 
authorities implemented these various measures to help safeguard financial stability in 
consecutive stages now known as the six Bank Packages. The first two Bank Packages at the 
outset of the crisis involved guarantee programs that are the focus of this paper. The Bank 
Package I guarantee scheme (known in Denmark as the “General State Guarantee”) was 
introduced with the October 2008 passage of the Financial Stability Act, and the Bank 
Package II guarantee scheme (known in Denmark as the “Individual State Guarantee”) was 
based on a February 2009 amendment to the same Act. The main difference between the two 
guarantee schemes was their breadth. While the first was a blanket guarantee—covering 
essentially all Danish banks and all unsecured debt regardless of maturity, complexity, or 
any other terms or conditions of the instrument—the second required applications by 
individual credit institutions for specific debt issuances.  
Program Description 
Bank Package I 
The first Bank Package implemented in October 2008 consisted of two main components. 
First, it established an unlimited government guarantee for all claims of depositors and other 
unsecured creditors in Danish banks who were members of the Private Contingency Agency 
(a private consortium of Danish banks established in 2007), to the extent such claims were 
not otherwise covered by other programs such as the Danish Deposit Guarantee Scheme.4 
Around the time of its implementation, this component of the package was often referred to 
as the “Guarantee Scheme” or the “General State Guarantee.” Its purpose was to “set up a 
safety net for two years” to “safeguard financial stability by contributing to the resumption 
 
3 DKK 43 billion is approximately €5.76 billion according to the average Jun. 2008 through Aug. 2008 
exchange rate (€1 = DKK 7.4614) 
4 Act on Financial Stability specifies, “By simple creditors, this Act means depositors and creditors whose 
claims are not covered by sections 132 and 136 of the Financial Business Act. Creditors whose claims are 
based on covered bonds, cf. section 16 a of the Financial Business (SDO) Act, are not covered by the guarantee 
scheme in this Act.” 
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of interbank lending” (State Aid NN51/2008). This blanket state-backed guarantee scheme 
expired in September 2010. 
Secondly, the Bank Package I legislation also created a Winding-up Company, owned by the 
State, with a mandate to handle distressed firms and administer the guarantee scheme. If any 
scheme member banks failed, the Winding-up Company would ensure that “depositors and 
other unsecured creditors can be repaid pursuant to the guarantee in the context of an 
orderly winding up” (State Aid NN51/2008). In such a situation, the Winding-up Company 
would provide capital to a newly established company which would take over and wind up 
the failing bank. The Winding-up Company was originally designed with no set end date and 
still exists today. The Winding-up Company was initially named “Afviklingsselskabet til 
sikring af den finansielle Stabilitet.” Today it is named “Finansiel Stabilitet” and is also 
referred to as the Financial Stability Company. 
The General State Guarantee operated on an all-in or all-out approach to the banks’ 
participation under the scheme rather than on applications for a state guarantee of 
individual issues of debt. The scheme’s underlying legislation, the Act of Financial Stability, 
was based on an October 5, 2008, agreement between the State and the Private Contingency 
Association (PCA) (a group simultaneously represented by the Danish Bankers Association) 
which stipulated that the PCA would be charged for the government guarantee through 
annual payments. The guarantee scheme covered only banks that requested by October 13, 
2008, to become a member of the Danish PCA.5 
The PCA’s extensive involvement in the design and funding of the General State Guarantee 
highlights Denmark’s collective, collaborative, industry-focused approach to addressing 
financial crises. The PCA was formed in 2007 by the banking industry. From 1994 until then, 
Denmark had operated a public deposit insurance scheme that was ultimately judged to be 
in violation of EU state aid rules in 2007 (Woll 2014). As a result, the Danish banking industry 
banded together and established the PCA as a private alternative for distressed banks. In 
2008, the PCA was first tested when Roskilde Bank became distressed; the PCA took over 
joint ownership of Roskilde Bank with Danmarks Nationalbank (the central bank of 
Denmark). However, the failing bank’s major losses exhausted the PCA’s funds and thus 
underscored the need for an expanded government role in future winding-ups and financial 
sector interventions. 
Through the PCA, the banking industry significantly contributed to the funding of the 
scheme, both by directly paying the government for the guarantee with DKK 15 billion and 
by contributing another DKK 10 billion to cover losses. The PCA also committed to contribute 
another DKK 10 billion to cover any further losses (although this second DKK 10 billion was 
never needed). The contribution of individual PCA-member banks was managed through the 
PCA. As a result of this funding structure, another way to conceptualize Bank Package I was 
as an industry-financed scheme where the State would only need to step in when losses 
exceed DKK 35 billion.  
Bank Package II 
In January 2009, the Danish government implemented Bank Package II via a legislative 
amendment to the Act on Financial Stability. Bank Package II had two parts: the Individual 
 
5 In Danish the PCA is called the Det Private Beredskab (DPB) and is also sometimes translated as the Private 
Reserve Fund. Some translations of the Act on Financial Stability refer to the PCA more specifically as banks 
which contribute to the Private Emergency Banking, Savings and Shareholders' Compensation Fund. 
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State Guarantee and a recapitalization scheme which gave banks access to capital through 
preferred shares acquired by the government for a total of potentially up to DKK 100 billion.  
The Individual State Guarantee could cover newly issued debt with maturities of up to three 
years in order to “ensure the credit institutions have continued access to medium term 
liquidity and by that, avoi[d] the banks cutting off loans and credits” (State Aid N31a 2009). 
The government does not appear to have established minimum maturity requirements for 
eligible debt. At the time of implementation, this guarantee was known by some as the 
“Individual State Guarantee,” “Credit Scheme,” and/or the “Transition Scheme.” Under this 
program, all credit institutions which met minimum capital requirements, including 
commercial banks as well as mortgage credit institutions (which were not covered in the 
General State Guarantee), were able to apply for a state guarantee for individual issues of 
unsubordinated and unsecured debt and for issues of supplemental security for covered 
bonds or covered mortgage bonds. Any application for a state guarantee under this scheme 
had to be submitted no later than December 31, 2010.  
Fees were calculated in line with the October 2008 recommendations of the Governing 
Council of the European Central Bank on government guarantees for bank debt and were 
based on the creditworthiness of the applying institution.  
In order to achieve European Commission approval, the Danish government had to request 
an extension of the Individual State Guarantee every six months. The terms of the Individual 
Guarantee remained the same during the first two extensions. These included 
“remuneration, behavioural constraints, and reporting requirements” (State Aid N415 
2009). Failure to comply with risk restrictions or other risky behavior could lead to exclusion 
from the schemes, after which it would not be possible for such banks or branches to re-
enter. However, during the third extension, new “viability review requirements and an 
additional reporting obligation” were introduced and the guarantee fee increased in 
accordance with European Commission guidelines for extended guarantees (State Aid N257 
2010). Specifically, the guarantee fee was increased to be higher than the original pricing 
formula recommended by the European Central Bank in October 2008 at least by 20 basis 
points for banks with a rating of A+ or A, 30 basis points for banks rated A-, and 40 basis 
points for banks rated below A- or banks without a rating (State Aid N257 2010).  
Outcomes 
While the total amount of guaranteed debt under the General Guarantee is not readily 
available, the amount was clearly substantial. Because coverage extended to all institutions 
that contributed to the PCA, effectively all of the Danish banking industry in terms of market 
share was covered (Woll 2014). Only 14 banks with inconsequential market share chose not 
to be covered (Gry Braad 2008). 
The effectiveness of the guarantee schemes at avoiding bank failures in Denmark must be 
evaluated with the understanding that Denmark’s financial sector was dominated by small 
and medium-sized banks at the time of the Global Financial Crisis. For example, despite a 
total number of about 140 financial institutions operating in Denmark in 2008, only five had 
an operating capital of over DKK 50 billion and only an additional 12 had over DKK 10 billion 
in 2008 (Woll 2014). During Bank Package I in particular, the Winding-up Company known 
as Finansiel Stabilitet took over banking activities from eight failing banks. The amount of 
guaranteed debt that needed to be paid out and the overall cost of winding up distressed 
firms totaled around DKK 22.5 billion. However, despite the losses, by the end of the 
program, estimates indicated that Bank Package I generated an upside of DKK 2.5 billion for 
the Danish government. By the time Bank Package II initially expired in December of 2010, 
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it had guaranteed debt issuances of about 50 institutions that totaled approximately DKK 
194 billion. 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The Danish government passed the General State Guarantee as part of Bank 
Package I on October 10, 2008, and the Individual State Guarantee as part of Bank 
Package II on February 2, 2009. 
The General State Guarantee was part of a two-part package that became known as Bank 
Package I. First, it declared that all banks that were members of the private consortium of 
Danish banks known as the Private Contingency Association (PCA) were automatically 
covered by an unlimited guarantee on deposits and debts to unsecured creditors until 
September 30, 2010. Banks not already members could sign up until October 13, 2008. Once 
an institution joined the guarantee it was not an option to opt out, but non-compliance with 
the conditions could lead to exclusion. 
Second, it created a state-owned Winding-up Company called Finansiel Stabilitet that would 
secure payment of creditor claims to distressed institutions and handle the controlled 
dismantling of financial institutions that no longer met solvency requirements.  
The Individual State Guarantee was introduced as part of a multi-part scheme today known 
as Bank Package II. First, it introduced a guarantee scheme for newly issued debt (by banks 
and other credit institutions) to be administered by Finansiel Stabilitet. Second, it gave banks 
access to capital through preferred shares acquired by the government, for a total of 
potentially up to DKK 100 billion. The Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs 
administered the recapitalization scheme.  
2. Both guarantee schemes were established pursuant to the statutory authority of 
the Danish Act on Financial Stability. 
The General State Guarantee was based on an agreement from October 5, 2008, between the 
Danish government and a private consortium of Danish banks known as the Private 
Contingency Association. That agreement was then codified into law on October 10, 2008, in 
the Act on Financial Stability.  
The Individual State Guarantee was enacted on February 4, 2009, through an Act to Amend 
the Act on Financial Stability. 
3. In accordance with European Commission (EC) Treaty state aid rules, both 
schemes required and received EC approval to be implemented. 
The Danish authorities notified the European Commission (EC) on October 8, 2008, of the 
General Guarantee and received the EC’s approval on October 10, 2008, under a new, 
simplified protocol for emergency rescue measures. The Commission found the scheme to 
be “compatible with EU state aid rules because it [was] the most appropriate means to 
address the risk of a severe disturbance in the Danish economy, while keeping potential 
distortions of competition to a minimum through effective safeguard mechanisms” (State 
Aid: Commission 2008).  
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The Individual State Guarantee was presented to the EC on January 23, 2009, and received 
approval by the EC on February 3, 2009. The EC found that the measures of Bank Package II 
were “limited in time and scope, require[d] market oriented remuneration and contain[ed] 
sufficient safeguards to avoid abuses” and thus compatible with the EC Treaty (State Aid: 
Commission 2009).  
As discussed in more detail below, the need to structure the Guarantees in such a way as to 
ensure EC approval significantly influenced the design of certain program features. 
4. The estimated cost in terms of losses under the General State Guarantee upon its 
introduction was between DKK 10 and 35 billion, and the maximum amount that 
could be issued under the Individual State Guarantee was DKK 600 billion. 
The total amount covered by the General State Guarantee is not readily available. However, 
when the General State Guarantee was enacted, the Danish government estimated the cost 
of scheme in terms of losses would be at least DDK 10 billion. The Private Contingency 
Association committed to contributing up to DKK 35 billion to cover initial losses on 
guaranteed debt. The Danish government committed to covering any and all losses 
exceeding the DKK 35 billion.  
With the Individual State Guarantee, the Danish government estimated that the maximum 
amount issued would not exceed DKK 600 billion.  
5. The General State Guarantee automatically covered all 137 existing member banks 
of the Private Contingency Association (PCA), and some banks were able to apply 
for PCA membership and thus guarantee coverage in the days immediately after 
the scheme was enacted. Under the Individual State Guarantee, all Danish banks 
and credit institutions that met certain solvency requirements were eligible to 
apply for guarantees for specific debt issuances. 
The General State Guarantee covered all Danish banks that were already members of the 
Private Contingency Association or that elected to join by October 13, 2008. Foreign banks 
registered in Denmark, including subsidiaries of foreign banks, could join the scheme fully. 
In addition, debt obligations of banks to foreign nationals were covered. Banks and branches 
participating in the General State Guarantee could not subsequently withdraw from the 
scheme. Failure to comply with risk restrictions or other behaviors could lead to exclusion 
from the Guarantee Scheme; it would not be possible for such bank or branch to re-enter. 
Under the Individual State Guarantee, Danish banks, subsidiaries in Denmark of foreign 
banks, and Danish credit institutions which satisfied certain capital requirements in the 
Danish Financial Business Act were eligible to apply for a state guarantee for a specific 
issuance of debt granted on a case-by-case basis. The terms of the state guarantee were set 
out in an individual guarantee document with terms determined through negotiation 
between the credit institution applying for the state guarantee and the Winding-Up 
Company, Finansiel Stabilitet. 
6. The General State Guarantee covered all unsecured debt that was not otherwise 
covered, regardless of type. Under the Individual State Guarantee, existing and 
new non-repayable unsecured debts and supplementary collateral were all 
eligible. 
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The General State Guarantee guaranteed all depositors and unsecured creditors against 
losses to the extent that those claims were not otherwise covered (cf. sections 132 and 136 
of the Danish Financial Business Act). The guarantee did not include covered bonds (cf. 
section 16a of the Financial Business Act), nor did it cover claims based on tier 1 and 2 capital 
in the form of hybrid core capital and subordinate loan capital (cf. Sections 132 and 136 of 
the Financial Business Act).  
The Individual State Guarantee covered specific existing and new unsecured debts and 
supplementary collateral (junior covered bonds), including commercial papers, senior 
unsecured bonds, supplementary securitized capital covered bonds, and new loans covering 
existing debt. Subordinated debt was not covered.  
The non-inclusion of covered debt in the General State Guarantee came to be seen by many 
as an error that undermined the covered bond market. In seeking and obtaining approval 
from the European Commission for the inclusion of covered bonds in their own programs, 
Finnish and Swedish authorities specifically cited the example of Denmark, where the non-
inclusion of covered debt in the General State Guarantee was seen as resulting in the drying 
up of that market. As noted, the Individual State Guarantee specifically included covered 
bonds. 
7. Under the General State Guarantee, debt of any maturity could be guaranteed, but 
the guarantee on that debt expired by September 30, 2010, regardless of the debt’s 
actual maturity. With the Individual State Guarantee, eligible debt could have a 
maturity of up to three years maximum. 
The government does not appear to have established minimum maturity requirements for 
eligible debt under the Individual State Guarantee.   
8. All currencies appear to have been eligible for both guarantees. 
Programs documents did not contain language restricting the currencies that were eligible. 
9. Neither scheme capped the extent to which an individual institution could 
participate. 
Program documents did not contain language limiting the amount of an individual 
institution’s participation in either scheme. 
10. The fee for participating in either scheme depended on the creditworthiness of the 
eligible institution. 
Under the General State Guarantee, the Private Contingency Association (PCA) paid an 
annual fee of DKK 7.5 billion for two years in addition to an initial DKK 10 billion. The PCA 
committed to paying another DKK 10 billion if losses surpassed DKK 25 billion; however, 
this condition was never triggered. Fees for individual banks were risk-adjusted and 
calculated by the PCA in relation to each bank’s required capital and solvency rules. 
Under the Individual State Guarantee, beneficiary institutions paid a fee based on the 
Recommendations of the European Central Bank. These fees were risk-adjusted and based 
on the credit default swap (CDS) spread for the applicant credit institution. For banks with 
CDS data, the calculation of CDS spreads was based on “(i) the median value of 5 year CDS 
spreads over a sample period starting on 1 January 2007 and ending on 31 August 2008, or 
(ii) the median value of the 5 year CDS spreads during the same sample period for the rating 
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category of the bank concerned, whichever is the lowest” (State Aid N31a/2009). For banks 
without CDS data nor representative CDS data who still had a credit rating, an equivalent 
CDS spread could be derived from the median value of five-year CDS spreads during the same 
sample period for the rating category of the bank concerned. The total price of the credit 
guarantee also included the add-on fee of 50 basis points. For banks without 
CDS/representative CDS data and without a credit rating, an equivalent CDS spread was to 
be derived from the median value of five-year CDS spreads during the same sample period 
for the lowest rating category.  
After the third extension of the Individual State Guarantee, there was an increase in the 
guarantee fee based on the European Commission’s updated compatibility conditions for the 
renewal of guarantee schemes. Specifically, the guarantee fee was increased to be higher 
than the original pricing formula recommended by the European Central Bank in October 
2008 at least by 20 basis points for banks with a rating of A+ or A, 30 basis points for banks 
rated A-, and 40 basis points for banks rated below A- or banks without a rating (State Aid 
N257/2010).  
There were several other conditions relating to fees under the Individual State Guarantee: 
For issues of junior covered bonds the guarantee premiums would be determined on the 
basis of a market-based risk assessment. For both issues of unsubordinated and unsecured 
debt and issues of junior covered bonds, the maximum aggregate premium would not exceed 
0.95 percent per annum. If the guaranteed loan was issued in a currency other than Danish 
kroner, the guarantee premium could be increased to reflect the increased costs involved 
with making payments in another currency. 
For banks using both schemes, the benefits of the Individual Guarantee were free until the 
General Guarantee expired. As of October 1, 2010, banks that wished to be covered by the 
Individual Guarantee had to pay a fee for continued guarantees. By contrast, mortgage credit 
institutions and banks that were not members of the PCA had to pay a premium for the 
Individual Guarantee for its full duration. 
11. Participants in both guarantees had to agree to several other behavioral 
requirements.  
Both guarantees shared the same additional requirement on executive compensation, 
dividend payment, balance sheet strengthening, reporting, and other behaviors. The Act on 
Financial Stability established a ban on dividend payments and share repurchases by banks 
as well as new stock options for management. Expiring stock option programs could not be 
renewed or extended. In addition, banks had to adopt a more cautious approach and 
strengthen their balance sheets during 2009 and 2010.  
In addition, the schemes imposed other behavioral safeguards and monitoring and 
enforcement procedures. Banks participating in the schemes could not undertake mass 
marketing invoking the fact that the unsecured creditors were now insured against losses. 
Moreover, participating banks could not undertake a significant expansion of their activities 
which would not have taken place in the absence of the arrangement. The Private 
Contingency Association committed to reporting to the Danish Financial Supervisory 
Authority on any abuse by its members. The Financial Supervisory Authority committed to 
monitoring the banks based on a series of quantitative indicators such as growth in loans, 
exposure to certain sectors, concentration risk, growth in risk-adjusted loans, etc.  
During the third extension of the Individual Guarantee, additional conditions were 
introduced including viability review requirements and an additional reporting obligation. 
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12. The deadline for issuance was Sep. 30, 2010, under the General State Guarantee 
and Dec. 31, 2010, under the Individual State Guarantee, although the later 
deadline was ultimately re-opened and extended to December 31, 2013.  
In 2012 the Finance Committee of the Danish Parliament decided to extend the Individual 
State Guarantee so that under certain conditions banks could extend or issue debt until the 
end of 2013 with an individual government guarantee expiring by the end of 2016. 
III. Evaluation 
While it can be difficult to isolate the overall effect of any specific policy measure used as 
part of broader response to the Great Financial Crisis, the Danish government regards both 
guarantee schemes as having helped Denmark’s financial sector recover. In its 2010 financial 
stability report, Danmarks Nationalbank noted improvements in the short-term money 
market following the introduction of the General State Guarantee. However, it also concluded 
that prices were still higher than pre-crisis and that “the spread is greater in Denmark than 
in the euro area even though Danish banking institutions are comprised by the [the General 
State Guarantee].” The 2011 financial stability report observed that “[s]everal banking 
institutions have made extensive use of [the Individual State Guarantee],” with such use 
having “helped to bridge the customer funding gap” for two-thirds of participating 
institutions. In their 2014 report “The Financial Crisis in Denmark: Causes, Consequences 
and Lessons,” the Danish Committee on the causes of the financial crisis posited that the 
General Guarantee “was necessary and created stability in the sector,” and that the Individual 
Guarantee successfully “facilitated a difficult transition on the cessation of Bank Package I.”  
Some have noted that while the industry-financed nature of the guarantees and especially 
the General State Guarantee protected the Danish public budget to a larger degree than other 
countries’ programs, the result was that the guarantees were also costly for the Danish 
banking industry (Woll 2014). 
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